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statute is remedial and should be construed liberally. 45 Since
the Minnesota court recognizes the right of plaintiff to prove his
case by questioning defendant, its position in Hoffman, the basis
of which appears to be "fairness" to defendant, is difficult to
justify. Similarly, if the statute is to be construed liberally, the
limitation of questions to "all material matters" should not be
interpreted to exclude questions of opinion. Inasmuch as evidence of proper medical practice in a particular community is
essential to establish defendant's negligence, it is clearly a material matter.
Therefore, it is submitted that if the Minnesota court desires to rely on outstate law for guidance on this issue it should
rely on what that law presently is. Since the majority of the
cases relied on in Ericksen have since been overruled, the court
should adopt the McDermott position and permit plaintiff to examine defendant on all material matters of fact and opinion. It
is further submitted that the court should not require an "offer
of proof" since the nature of the questioning of an adverse party
is usually exploratory and thus it would not be reasonable to require plaintiff to state what he will prove by questioning defendant.

Evidence: Testimony of State-Employed
Physician Inadmissible
Defendant was arrested for the fatal shooting of his wife.
A Board of Examiners found him mentally incompetent to stand
trial and committed him to the Minnesota Security Hospital.'
After two months of treatment by the hospital's psychiatric consultant, defendant was adjudged competent to stand trial on the
charge of first degree murder. Defendant pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity 2 and introduced exhaustive medical testimony
45. Bylund v. Carrol, 203 Minn. 484, 488, 281 N.W. 873, 875 (1938)
(referring to MNN. STAT. § 9816 (Mason 1927), which is similar to
MwNq. R. Civ. P. 43.02).
1. Upon finding that a defendant is unable to stand trial before
a verdict is rendered, the court is required to commit him to the proper
state institution for safekeeping and treatment. See M.Nw. STAT. §
631.18 (1965).

2. If at the time of committing the crime, defendant was unable
to discern "the nature of his act, or that it was wrong," he is excused
from criminal liability in Minnesota. See MqNI. STAT. § 611.026 (1965).
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in his defense. 3 On rebuttal the prosecution attempted to introduce the testimony of the treating psychiatric consultant from
the Security Hospital. The defense objected on the ground
of physician-patient privilege. 4 The trial judge overruled the
objection, stating that the privilege does not apply to a stateemployed physician and his institutionalized patient. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed. The
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minnesota
privilege statute 5 applies without distinction to private physicianpatient relationships and relationships between state-employed
physicians and patients confined in state hospitals. The court
further held that the defendant did not waive the privileged
character of the relationship by placing in issue the defense of
insanity and by furnishing his own testimony and that of medical experts on the subject. State v. Fontana, 152 N.W.2d 503
(Minn. 1967).
The physician-patient privilege, which was unknown at common law,6 has been a fertile source of controversy since its initial
3.

The defendant testified at great length about his pre-crime

medical history. This testimony included a detailed description of the
defendant's inability to defecate for long periods of time, and a general
account of the decrepit state of his bowels. The four doctors who
testified for the defense concentrated on his mental state. They called
the defendant a hypochondriacal schizophrenic, an undifferentiated
schizophrenic, and a schizophrenic with paranoid tendencies. Record at
149, 202, 205, 239, 274, 320.
4. A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be allowed to disclose any information or
any opinion based thereon which he acquired in attending the
patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity; after the decease of such
patient, in an action to recover insurance benefits, where the
insurance has been in existence two years or more, the beneficiaries shall be deemed to be the personal representatives of
such deceased person for the purpose of waiving the privilege
hereinbefore created, and no oral or written waiver of the
privilege hereinbefore created shall have any binding force or
effect except that the same shall be made upon the trial or
examination where the evidence is offered or received....
Ch. 640, § 4 [1967] Minn. Laws 788
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1947).
amended this section to include the words "or dentist" following the
word "surgeon."
5. See id.
6. See C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COiM10UNICATIONs BETWEEN PHYsIClAN AND PATIENT 10 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DEWITT]; C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; 8 J.
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited
In Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573
WIGMORE].
(1776), Lord Mansfield first rejected an assertion of the privilege:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure,
he would be guilty of a breach of honor and a great indis-

cretion; but to give that information in a court of justice,
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adoption in New York in 1828. 7 Despite the forceful opposition
of some of the most respected legal minds in the country,8 the
privilege has been adopted by two-thirds of the states and many
of the territorial possessions of the United States.0
Among the jurisdictions where the privilege has been
adopted, there is no universal agreement as to the scope of the
privilege and what constitutes waiver thereof. However, as a
general rule to which there are a few notable exceptions,1 ° it has
not been variations in statutory language which have resulted
in the wide jurisdictional differences, but rather the disparate
ways in which various courts have dealt with waiver of the privi-

lege. '
which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be
imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.
7. N.Y. REV. STAT. art. 8, § 73 (1828).
8. See, e.g., DEWITT 39; McCopmvcK §§ 101-08; A. VANDERBILT,
MnMv IM STANDARDS OF JuDicIAL A nmsTRATroN 342, 578 (1949); 8
WIGMORE §§ 2380-91; Chaffee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice
Served or Obstructed By Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness
Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6
COLTmJ. L. REV. 388 (1906); Sawyer, The Physician-PatientPrivilege:
Some Reflections, 14 DRAKE L. REV. 83 (1965).
9. See DEWITT app., for a collection of the various privilege
statutes.
10. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1955); McH." STAT. ANwN.
§ 27.911 (1938); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1206 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
In California, the doctor(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289.1 (1950).
patient privilege does not apply in criminal cases. See People v.
Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 369 P.2d 714, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 852 (1962), cert. dismissed, 372 U.S. 933 (1963).
11. In several jurisdictions, strict interpretations of the physicianpatient privilege statutes have been applied. In Missouri, whose
privilege statute is almost identical to Minnesota's (compare Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060(5) (1939), with MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1965)), a
strict judicial interpretation has resulted in several decisions which are
directly opposite to the resolution of the Fontana case. See State v.
Cochran, 356 Mo. 778, 203 S.W.2d 707 (1947). In a recent decision, the
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the mere commencement of personal
injury litigation would be considered an implied waiver of the privilege. Mathis v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1966). For comment on
the advantages and drawbacks of this approach, see 51 MINN. L. REv.
575 (1966).
In another recent case, the New York court stated that it was
clear that when medical proof of causation of disability or death is
tendered in support of a claim, the physician-patient privilege is waived
on the thesis that the claimant's own essential proof has opened the
door. Beeler v. Hildan Crown Container Corp., 26 App. Div. 163, 271
The New York court has also held that the
N.Y.S.2d 373 (1966).
patient, in both civil and criminal cases, implicitly waives the privilege by personally testifying in detail as to his injury or illness, by
voluntarily disclosing his physical ailments or conditions as well as by
voluntarily calling a physician as a witness. People v. Preston, 13
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The Minnesota court has viewed the statutory privilege as a
broad grant of power to the patient to exclude medical testimony
in lawsuits. 1 2 Although the court has said that "judges should
take care to see that the privilege is not made an instrument for
cheating justice,"' 3 and that it is a shield and not a sword, 14 the
cases manifest a consistent judicial reluctance to interfere with
or restrict the patient's exercise of the privilege. 5
The Minnesota court, however, has generally recognized a
waiver of the privilege in three ins tances. Mass v. Laursen6
held that the introduction of a physician's testimony is a waiver
of the privilege to the extent that the opponent may crossexamine him as to any information acquired during the course
of treatment. In addition, State v. Emerson 7 held that the privilege is waived when a defendant consents to a routine physical
examination which he knows is being conducted for the purpose
of securing evidence against him. Finally, waiver has been found
generally where the litigant has been examined by two or more
physicians at the same time, and he attempts to introduce the
testimony of one while excluding that of the other. In such a
case, the court has found a waiver as to the testimony of the second doctor.' s
Misc. 2d 802, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (King County Ct. 1958).
The strict interpretation, as exemplified by the cases mentioned

above, does not have the support of the majority of United States
jurisdictions where the privilege has been enacted. See 8 WIGMORE
§§ 2389-90. It is rather the liberal approach which has gained favor
in this country. It has been held that lestimony by the complainant
as to the nature of his injuries will not waive the privilege. See, e.g.,
Roeder v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 25I Minn. 168, 106 N.W.2d 624
(1960).
The Minnesota court has also stated that the introduction of
testimony by one doctor will not waive the privilege as to other
doctors who have treated the litigant for the same or different ail-

ments. Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954);
Polin v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 159 Minn. 410, 199 N.W. 87 (1924).

12. "As far as the statute goes, it creates a right with which
courts have no right to interfere." Nelson v. Ackerman, 249 Minn. 582,
592, 83 N.W.2d 500, 507 (1957). "The statute was enacted for the benefit of the patient and any change or correction should come from
the legislature and not as a result of judicial legislation by the
courts." Tweith v. Duluth, M. & I.R. By., 66 F. Supp. 427, 431 (D.
Minn. 1946).
13. Doll v. Scandrett, 201 Minn. 316, 321, 276 N.W. 281, 283 (1937).
See also Olson v. Court of Honor, 100 Minn. 117, 110 N.W. 374 (1907).
14. Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 408, 72 N.W.2d 357, 359
(1955).
15. See Mass v. Laursen, 219 Minn. 461, 18 N.W.2d 233 (1945).
16. 219 Minn. 461, 18 N.W.2d 233 (1945).
17. 266 Minn. 217, 123 N.W.2d 382 (1963).
18. Leifson v. Henning, 210 Minn. 311, 298 N.W. 41 (1941); Doll v.
Scandrett, 201 Minn. 316, 276 N.W. 281 (1937).
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Waiver has also been recognized in one specialized instance
which is especially germane to the instant case. The Minnesota
Court in Ostrowski v. Mockridge"9 held that the privilege is not
waived by a party who calls medical experts with reference to
information acquired by another doctor who attended to
him. In other words, if a party is examined by doctors A and
B, the party may then introduce the testimony of doctor C whose
knowledge is based only upon the written examination reports of
A and B while still retaining the ability to assert the privilege
against personal testimony by A and B.
The first part of the Fontana opinion dealt with the ground
upon which the trial judge allowed the psychiatric consultant's
testimony: namely that the privilege does not apply to state
hospital inmates. Holding this to be error, the court reasoned
that there is no valid reason why the fact that the taxpayers pay
the medical bill should operate to make normally confidential
communications fair game for public scrutiny. Hence, the court
concluded that if the physician-patient privilege exists at all, it
should exist without distinction as to patients in state supported
institutions, unless the statute specifically provides to the contrary.20 Since the state conceded 21 that the trial judge erred
in allowing the psychiatric consultant's testimony on the ground
that Fontana had been in a state hospital, the portion of the
court's opinion devoted to this question was surplusage.
22
The court then reached the central issue in the case:
whether the defendant's use of medical testimony resulted in a
waiver of the physician-patient privilege as it applied to the psychiatric consultant. While sympathetically acknowledging the
19. 242 Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954).

20. See Op.

ATT'y GEN. OF MiNy.

88-A-27-D (1933); Smart v.

Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 190, 105 S.W. 709, 716 (1907). See also
Linscott v. Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 362, 37 P.2d 26, 31 (1934); McGrath
v. State, 200 Misc. 165, 169, 104 N.Y.S.2d 882, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Washington v. Sullivan, 60 Wash. 2d 214, 244, 373 P.2d 474, 479 (1962). Contra
Solovino v. State, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Ct. Cl. 1946), modified,
271 App. Div. 618, 67 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1946) (increasing damages), aff'd as
modified, 297 N.Y. 460, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947).

21. Brief for Respondent at 6.
22. At the trial, the judge excluded the psychiatric consultant's testimony without any reference to the issue of waiver. On appeal, although the defendant's brief dealt only with the ground upon which the
trial judge excluded the testimony, the issue of waiver was strongly
raised in the state's brief. Under Minnesota appellate procedure, the
supreme court is required to examine and render judgment on the
record before it, even if assignments of error are insufficient to raise
an error. Mn'. STAT. § 632.06 (1965). See State v. Siebke, 216 Minn.
181, 12 N.W.2d 186 (1943).
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state's contention that there is no justification for a rule which
allows a defendant to permit a physician favorable to his case to
testify as to confidential matters, and then to assert the statutory
privilege against the testimony of any opposing expert on the
same subject, 23 the court rejected the state's contention that
Fontana had waived the physician-patient privilege by his extensive use of medical and personal testimony. The court stated
that analogous foreign decisions cited in support of this contention could not be relied upon since they were the products of
dissimilarities in statutory language. 4 The court reviewed the
three instances in Minnesota where waiver of the privilege has
generally been found. 25 However, after making no effort to
analyze or distinguish them, the court attempted to apply the
specialized instance of waiver utilized in Ostrowski v. Mockridge.
Finally, the court cryptically stated that the privilege has
greater force in criminal cases because the privilege has its roots
in constitutional derivations. In support of this conclusion, the
court relied on a recent Minnesota case which held,26 in effect,
that absent express statutes protecting the accused against the
dangers of self-incrimination in cases where he pleads insanity as
a defense, the courts have no legal basis for ordering an examination either to determine his mental condition at the time of the
alleged crime or to qualify an expert psychiatric witness to test27
ify at trial.
The court's difficulty in applying the privilege statute may
be partially the result of inherent ambiguity in the language of
the statute. Although the statute makes specific mention of
waiver, it is impossible from the face of the provision to tell
whether such language was intended to apply to cases like Fontana or only to those of a different nature. In view of the punctuation of the statute28 it seems most likely that the section dealing with waiver was not included with the intent to cover situa23. At some points the court seemed apologetic to the state for
the impact of its decision on the administration of criminal justice.
State v. Fontana, 152 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 19137).
24. Id. at 507.
25. Id. at 506.
26. State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966).
27. The court stated that such examinations would violate the
accused's right against self-incrimination. U.S. CoxsT. amend. V;
MNx. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7. See 51 MiNN. L. REV. 306 (1966) for a detailed discussion of State v. Olson, 274 Mim. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966).
28. The semi-colon in the middle of the statute makes it difficult
to tell whether the waiver language at the end refers back to the first
several lines or only to the matter after the semi-colon concerning
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tions like that found in the instant case. 29
Notwithstanding this problem with statutory phraseology,
the large portion of the Fontanaopinion dealing with the physician-patient privilege is not well argued. Such a criticism is
compelled by several factors. Initially, the language of the Minnesota statute does not compel the Fontana result. Although
the court stated that the varying decisions in different jurisdictions may be attributed to a dissimilarity of the various statutory
provisions, 30 this statement is inaccurate. A number of jurisdictions have privilege statutes almost identical to Minnesota's but
have reached opposite results in cases similar to Fontana,31 on
the public policy ground that the privilege must not be used
3 2
merely to suppress relevant evidence in courts of law.
Second, an analysis of the three instances the court cited
where waiver of the privilege is recognized in Minnesota was indispensable, 33 especially in the case of the unitary examination
by two or more physicians. 34 Logically, it is difficult to see how
the unitary examination is distinguishable from Fontana, since
the underlying rationale seems equally applicable to both: once
a party consents to a disclosure by one physician, 35 the reason
behind the privilege ceases to exist.36 In short, if the reason for
the statute is to save the patient from embarrassing public disclosures,3 7 it can properly be said that by calling one or more
physicians to discuss his medical problems, the party has shown
that he does not fear an open discussion of those problems.
Never, in the course of its opinion, did the court attempt to meet
this argument, although it was forcefully raised in the state's
brief.36
posthumous waiver by a decedent's personal representatives. See note
4 supra.
29. Although the court in Fontana included the waiver language
when it quoted the statute, it made no mention of the statutory language in its discussion of waiver later in the opinion. Moreover, when
it cites the statute, the court omits the words dealing with decedent's
representatives which are found between the semi-colon and the mention of waiver.
30. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 11 supra.
32. See, e.g., Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 293, 253 N.Y.S.2d
662, 667 (Ct. Cl. 1964).

33. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 3 supra (Fontana consented to disclosures by four).
36. 8 WioMoRE § 2390, at 862-65.
37.

See 8 WiGMoan § 2380, at 830; DEWiTr 24; McCoRMIcK § 101,

at 212.
38. Brief for Respondent at 11-14.
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In addition, it is difficult to see why the Fontanacourt relied
on the Ostrowski case. The trial record reveals only one occasion
out of four when the defendant asked one of his medical experts
to testify about information acquired by another physician in
attending him. The great bulk of the defendant's medical testimony was devoted to his pre-crime medical history and its implications as to his sanity at the time of the shooting. More disturbing is the fact that the discussion of information acquired
by another doctor was the court's only attempt to apply the privilege to the facts of the case.
Finally, the court failed completely to explain how the statutory physician-patient privilege is rooted in the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, if indeed that is what the
court meant. Nonetheless, one can conjecture that the court was
concerned with the method by which Fontana was committed
and treated in the state hospital. Since the commitment subsequent to the hearing before the Board of Examiners was compulsory, the defendant was forced to take treatment at the state
facility. 9 Because the treatment" was compulsory, any extractions of inculpatory evidence might also be considered compulsory, thereby violating the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination. This argument is extremely difficult to answer,
and it seems extraordinary that the court did not choose to
elaborate and rely on it. 41
Instead, the court cited Taylor v. United States, 42 where the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that there
was no waiver of the physician-patient privilege dispite the defendant's extensive use of medical testimony. In citing that decision as support for the proposition that the doctor-patient privilege is grounded in "constitutional roots," the Minnesota court
39. MINN. STAT. § 631.18 (1957).
40. Although the Fontana opinion makes no allusion thereto, the
court may have been worried about some of the methods used to treat
mental patients, such as shock, hypnosis, and drugs. Clearly, compulsory extractions of information obtained through the use of these methods would be inadmissible. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

41. The question whether judicial limitations on the defendant's
right to invoke the physician-patient privilege are violative of his
right against self-incrimination has been faced by several jurisdictions
(see note 11 supra), but ignored by the great majority (see DEWITT,
supra note 6, at 113). The latter seem to feel that a reading of the two
privileges together as appears to have been done in Fontana, would constitute such a restriction of the administration of criminal justice as to
be untenable.
42. 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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failed to make two seemingly crucial observations. First, the
federal court never made any statement to the effect that its
decision rested on constitutional grounds. Second, the federal
case was repudiated by Congress five months after it was handed
43
down by an amendment to the District of Columbia Code.
If this was indeed the rationale of the Minnesota court, then
the administration of criminal justice may be greatly hampered.
In every case in which a defendant raises the defense of insanity, the prosecution will be unable to introduce any medical
testimony unless the defendant consents. By careful use of the
physician-patient and self-incrimination privileges, a defendant
will effectively be able to parade favorable expert witnesses to
the stand without worrying about any unfavorable expert testimony. Such a situation clearly calls for redress.
A solution to this situation involves the close balancing of
two competing public policies: the need to provide the accused
with a guaranty against the use of compelled testimony in determining his guilt; and the need of the state and society for an effective administration of criminal justice. Under Fontana, the
former is given preference to the total exclusion of the latter.
Such a situation must not be allowed to stand. What is needed
is a solution which recognizes the validity of both policies, and,
since the answer apparently will not be forthcoming from the
present Minnesota Court,44 the legislature must provide the solution.
In the search for a workable compromise, it should be noted
that an impressive argument has been made for the retention of
the physician-patient privilege when psychiatric testimony is involved.45 It is said that unimpeded disclosure to psychiatrists is
absolutely essential to effective treatment.40
Considering the
sensitive nature of mental illness and the general lack of public
sophistication in this area,4 7 such a contention seems highly
plausible. Thus, any solution must take into account the valid
need to preserve, to whatever extent consistent with the two
other policy interests, the confidentiality of this relationship.

43. D.C. CODE AIM. § 14-308 (1955). The Taylor case was also
rejected by the American Law Institute soon after it was handed down
on the ground that such a handicap to the prosecution should not be
borne in light of the defendant's willingness to expose his medical
condition in an open courtroom. 32 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGs 237 (1955).
44. See note 12 supra.
45. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatristand Patient,28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952).
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 32.
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Although several approaches have been suggested, 48 one solution has been formulated which effectively balances the three
interests which must be protected. 49 It is based on the premise
that since all privileges are barriers to the ascertainment of facts,
there must be a strong benefit derived from the assertion of the
privilege in order to justify the obstacle to the discovery of fact
which the privilege will present. Starting with this assumption,
it is proposed that the privilege will not apply in those proceedings in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an
element of his claim or defense. Following such an introduction,
the presiding judge will make his own preliminary investigation
as to the importance, relevancy, and nature of the state's medical
testimony. Based on this investigation the judge will decide
whether a just resolution of the case demands that the privilege
be waived. The judge's investigation would reveal the extent
to which the prosecution would be handcuffed by the assertion
of the privilege, the danger of infringing the defendant's right
against self-incrimination," and finally, whether a disclosure of
48.

One approach, enacted by Congress for the District of Columbia

in response to Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
totally abrogates the physician-patient privilege in criminal cases when
the accused raises the defense of insanity or is charged with causing a
death. However, this fails to safeguard the confidentiality of the psychiatrist-patient relationship, and, in light of State v. Olson, 274 Minn.
225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966), it might also fail to meet Minnesota's selfincrimination standards.
Another solution proposes that the contents of psychiatric examinations made prior to trial shall be admissible in a proceeding to determine the defendant's mental condition whether or not such communication is deemed privileged. This proposal also ignores the confidential
aspect of the relationship. In addition, unless a bifurcated trial procedure was provided wherein the guilt issue was tried separately from
the insanity issue, it would raise serious self-incrimination problems.
For a discussion of the bifurcated trial, see 51 MIqN. L. REV. 306,
310-11 (1966).
49. 4 HAR. J. LEGIS. 307 (1967).
50. Naturally, if this investigation revealed that some of the evidence sought to be introduced would violate the privilege against selfincrimination, that evidence would have to be excluded. State v.
Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966). This dilemma concerning
the state's ability to introduce medical testimony has been squarely
faced in one jurisdiction. A number of 'Missouri cases hold that if an
accused raises the defense of insanity, he thereby waives not only the
physician-patient privilege, see note 11 supra, but also his constitutional
guaranty against self-incrimination. State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d 746
(Mo. 1959); State v. Sapp. 356 Mo. 705, 203 S.W.2d 425 (1947). This
approach apparently denies the controlling nature of two of the three
policy interests mentioned above: the confidentiality of the psychiatristpatient relationship, and the right of the accused to be protected
against self-incrimination.

